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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to investigate the relationship between chief executive 
officer (CEO) shareholding and company performance. Specifically, the 
study investigates the influence of the level of direct and indirect CEO 
shareholdings on the market growth, profitability and liquidity of companies. 
A sample comprising 59 companies was obtained from Bursa Malaysia 
within a five-year period from 2009 to 2013. Results reveal that most 
CEOs of Malaysian listed companies own company shares either directly 
or indirectly. The CEOs of listed companies in Malaysia tend to retain 
controlling stakes by possessing a significant amount of shares in their 
companies. As a result, these companies demonstrate improved financial 
performance. 
Keywords: CEO shareholding, company performance, Malaysian public 
listed companies 
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INTRODUCTION 
Given the advanced technology and stiff competition in the business world 
at present, many private companies are tempted to expand their business 
scale by increasing the capital share of the company. A means to increase 
capital is to go public via initial public offerings (IPOs), which lead to 
sharing company ownership with investors. In this case, overall control 
and decision making rights in the company are divided among the principal 
and investors. As a result, the CEO of the company, as the agent of the 
principal, always faces the dilemma of either controlling the company by 
holding more shares or raising funds by issuing more shares to investors. 
A CEO with low shareholding possesses less controlling power in 
company operations and management, whereas shareholders with high 
shareholding have more voting rights. Hence, shareholders can practice 
their voting rights to appoint the CEO. Many countries, such as Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and the United Kingdom, are inflexible in allowing 
a CEO with less shareholding to retain controlling rights in a company. 
Consequently, company expansion may slow down because of the obstacles 
a CEO faces in the accumulation of cash reserve for future expenditure or 
expansion. 
An increasing number of foreign companies have begun to register 
their IPOs in the United States. The main reason for this move is the 
flexibility offered by the United States SEC in terms of the substantial 
freedom of companies to decide their structure at the time of the offering. 
This flexibility includes the option that a CEO with less shareholding will 
retain the controlling right of the company. For instance, many young 
companies, such as Google, Alibaba and Facebook, registered their IPOs 
in the United States. Although the founders of these companies have small 
percentages of shares and still retain their controlling rights, these companies 
have raised high capitals in their IPOs. A case for this point is the founder of 
Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, who retained only 22% of company ownership 
shares after IPO (Fortune, 2012). However, the total amount of capital 
raised reached $16 billion (Bloomberg, 2012). Another example, Alibaba 
from China, raised $21.8 billion from its IPO in the US (Business Insider 
Malaysia, 2014). However, its founder, Ma Yun, still retained the controlling 
right even with only 7.8% of shareholding (The Straits Times, 2014). 
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Overall, these companies expanded quickly and performed very 
well despite the CEO having a low shareholding. However, studies on the 
effect of the proportion of CEO shareholding on company performance 
are scarce. Particularly, the gap is evident in situations where CEOs have a 
low shareholding proportion and do not have a dominant controlling right. 
Therefore, this research aims to investigate the relationship between CEO 
shareholding and company performance in Malaysia. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory emphasises the control issues resulting from conflicts of 
interest between top management and shareholders. Agency theory is built 
on the premise that the shareholder acts as a principal and delegates duties 
to the CEO, who is expected to act as an agent in the best interest of the 
principal. Three assumptions exist in agency theory. Firstly, the agent is risk-
averse. Secondly, the agent is self-centred. Lastly, the interests of the agent 
are distinct from those of the principal. According to the third assumption, 
the agent may have different objectives from the principal, so the agent 
pursues a self-serving agenda. This scenario increases the possibility of 
opportunistic actions by the agent. For instance, a CEO may decide to enter 
the company into an aggressive diversification program of mergers and 
acquisitions with modest or even negative returns to shareholders. Therefore, 
the agency problem occurs whenever the agent looks after objectives that 
are opposed to the goals of the principal. 
The CEO is one of the important components in the corporate 
governance of a company. However, to investigate a CEO with minimal 
shareholding will lead to improved corporate governance and company 
performance. According to agency theory arguments, CEOs have sufficient 
discretion to pursue objectives that are inconsistent with maximising 
shareholder wealth (Catherine & Jonathan, 1997). 
CEO Shareholdings 
Catherine and Jonathan (1997) claimed that the CEO is generally 
represented as the most powerful member of the organisation. However, 
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does a CEO with minimal shareholding retain the controlling right of 
the company? Controlling right refers to the power of the CEO who 
has typically legitimate authority in a company. The CEO is required to 
maintain the ownership position in a company to secure the controlling 
right and to be recognised as the manager and shareholder (Catherine & 
Jonathan, 1997; Bach & Smith, 2007). Zald (1969) argued that a CEO with 
significant shareholding has the ability to affect the company's direction 
and is likely to be more powerful than a CEO with minimal shareholding, 
as cited by Catherine and Jonathan (1997). In addition, a CEO with 
significant shareholding may be positioned to prevent involuntary dismissal 
(Fredrickson, Hambrick & Baumrin, 1988; Pfeffer, 1981; Catherine & 
Jonathan, 1997). Hence, a CEO with significant shareholding would cause 
either the agency problem with the shareholders or company performance 
improvement. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) emphasised that shareholding is tied to 
the economics of the CEO with the company stakeholders, as cited by 
Veprauskaite and Adams (2013). Accordingly, the CEO is provided with 
incentive in terms of CEO shareholding to maximise company performance. 
Company performance will be enhanced if a CEO possesses high 
shareholding (Bach & Smith, 2007). Fischer and Pollock (2004) found that 
the effect of high CEO shareholding on company performance post-IPO is 
interactive and positive. Bach and Smith (2007) claimed that a CEO with 
high shareholding can lead to improved company performance if the CEO 
is able to act without board interference. However, Veprauskaite and Adams 
(2013) found that the shareholding of the CEO implies that decision-making 
power has a negative effect on company performance. The results of the 
study by Veprauskaite and Adams (2013) support the agency theory-based 
notion, wherein a CEO with significant shareholding possesses increased 
decision-making power on the board; as a result, financial performance is 
reduced. 
Ozkan (2011) investigated the corporate governance of companies in 
the United Kingdom by examining the link between CEO 'pay performance' 
in terms of CEO shareholding and company performance. They found that 
the link between CEO pay performance in terms of CEO shareholding and 
company performance has not been completely effective as indicated in the 
Greenbury Report (1995). 
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Overall, several researchers found that a CEO will have a significant 
controlling right in a company if he or she has high shareholding; this 
situation will directly improve company performance (Zald, 1969, as 
cited in Catherine & Jonathan, 1997; Fredrickson, Hambrick & Baumrin, 
1988; Pfeffer, 1981; Catherine & Jonathan, 1997; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Veprauskaite & Adams, 2013; Bach & Smith, 2007; Ozkan, 2011). 
Meanwhile, only a few studies discussed the negative relationship between 
a CEO with minimal shareholding and company performance. Veprauskaite 
and Adams (2013) found that a high CEO shareholding does not imply high 
company performance. When a CEO has a high shareholding, he/she may 
exercise the controlling right in a company in favour of his/her own interest 
at the expense of the shareholders. 
Therefore, relevant hypotheses were developed as follows: 
H^ A negative relationship exists between direct CEO shareholding and 
company performance. 
H2: A negative relationship exists between indirect CEO shareholding and 
company performance. 
METHODOLOGY 
The sample in this study comprised 59 Malaysian publicly listed companies 
randomly selected from the list of Bursa Malaysia. The data covered the 
period of 2009 to 2013. Data on CEO shareholding and company financial 
performance were obtained from annual reports. The conceptual framework 
of the study based on the literature review and hypotheses is shown below: 
i Independent Variables: v CEO Shareholdings • Direct CEO Shareholding 
• Indirect CEO 
Shareholding 
Dependent Variables: 
S Company 
Performance 
• Market Growth 
• Profitability 
• Liquidity 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
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The measurement of research variables is indicated in Table 1. 
Table 1: Measurement of Research Variables 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
A. CEO 
Shareholdings 
1. Direct CEO 
Shareholding 
2. Indirect CEO 
Shareholding 
Dependent 
Variables 
B. Company 
Performance 
1. Earnings per 
Share 
2. Return on Assets 
3. Return on 
Equities 
4. Current Ratio 
Control Variable 
C. Company Size 
1. Total Assets 
Abbreviations 
Direct 
Indirect 
EPS 
ROA 
ROE 
CR 
TA 
Operationalisation 
Direct = Total Direct 
/ Total Shares' 
Outstanding X 100% 
Indirect = Total 
Indirect / Total Shares' 
Outstanding X 100% 
EPS = Profit After 
Tax / Total Share 
Outstanding X 100% 
ROA = Profit After Tax 
/ Total Assets X 100% 
ROE = Profit After Tax 
/ Total Shareholders' 
Equity X 100% 
Current Ratio (CR) 
= Current Assets/ 
Current Liabilities 
Natural log of 
company total assets 
Empirical 
Studies 
Catherine 
and Jonathan 
(1997) 
Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) 
Watson and 
Head (2004) 
Veprauskaite 
and Adams 
(2013) 
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DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of independent, dependent 
and control variables. The mean, mode and median of direct CEO 
shareholding are 8.00,0, and 2.91, respectively. The mean indicates that the 
average percentage of shares held by the CEO is 8. The standard deviation of 
direct CEO shareholding is 10.28, which means that the data are reasonably 
close to the mean. For indirect CEO shareholding, the mean is 13.58, the 
mode is 0.00, the median is 1.83 and the standard deviation is 17.90. The 
mean of 13.58 shows a tendency towards 13, and the standard deviation is 
close to the mean. 
EPS has a mean of 9.28, which indicates its average, a mode of-0.50 
and a median of 7.19. The standard deviation of EPS, 11.34, represents its 
amount of variation of dispersion. The mean, mode and median of ROA 
are 3.22, 3.33 and 4.12, respectively. The mean of ROE is 4.46, which 
indicates that the average ROE of the sample companies is 4.5. ROE has 
the high standard deviation of 12.81, which reveals the large spreading 
out of variation of dispersion. Moreover, the measurement of CR is the 
logarithm of the current ratio. The mean, mode and median of the current 
ratio (CR) are above 0.80 with a small standard deviation of 0.65, which 
indicates that the variation of dispersion of CR data is small. Company size 
as the control variable is measured by the logarithm of total assets (TA). 
Table 2 shows that the average of TA is 19.37. The mode and median of 
TA are 18.40 and 19.34, respectively, which are close to the mean. The 
standard deviation of 1.30 indicates a low variation of dispersion within 
the spreading out of the data. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent, 
Dependent and Control Variables 
Variables 
Independent Variables 
Direct 
Indirect 
Dependent Variables 
EPS 
ROA 
ROE 
CR 
Control Variable 
TA 
Mean 
8 
13.58 
9.28 
3.22 
4.46 
0.83 
19.37 
Mode 
0 
0 
-0.50 
3.33 
1.12 
0.88 
18.40 
Median 
2.91 
1.83 
7.19 
4.12 
6.61 
0.81 
19.34 
Standard 
Deviation 
10.28 
17.90 
11.34 
7.18 
12.81 
0.65 
1.30 
*N=295 observations 
Sample Company Profiling 
Table 3 presents the profile of the sample companies. Eight industries 
were identified from the 59 sample companies within a five-year period. 
Industrial crops and products have the highest frequency of 25 among the 
sample companies. Trade and services and consumer industries have the 
second and third highest frequency with 14 (23.73%) and 7 (11.86%), 
respectively. Finance and plantation possess the smallest and the same 
percentage of 1.69% (N=l) among the eight industries. 
CEO shareholdings are the independent variables in this research. On 
average, 37 CEOs of the sample companies had both direct and indirect 
CEO shareholdings from 2009 to 2013. Eighteen CEOs possessed only 
direct CEO shareholding, which has the highest percentage (30.50%) within 
five years. In 2012, 6 out of 59 CEOs of the sample companies had solely 
indirect CEO shareholding. During the same year, only one CEO did not 
have both direct and indirect shareholdings. 
Regarding company size, Table 3 reveals that throughout the five 
years, most of the sample companies had total assets within the range of 
RM100 million to RM500 million, with an average percentage of 48.14% 
(N=28). 
122 
Table 3: Sample Company Profiling 
Results N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Years 2009 to 2013 
Samples Company Industries 
Construction 
Consumer 
Finance 
Industrial Crops and Products 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trade and Services 
3 
7 
1 
25 
1 
5 
3 
14 
5.08 
11.86 
1.69 
42.37 
1.69 
8.47 
5.08 
23.73 
Years 
CEO 
Shareholdings 
CEO with both 
direct and indirect 
CEO with direct 
only 
CEO with indirect 
only 
CEO without both 
direct and indirect 
Company Size, TA 
<RM100 million 
>RM100million-
RM500 million 
> RM500 million 
2009 
35 
18 
3 
3 
14 
31 
14 
59.32 
30.50 
5.09 
5.09 
23.73 
52.54 
23.73 
2010 
39 
15 
3 
2 
14 
28 
17 
66.10 
25.43 
5.08 
3.39 
23.73 
47.46 
28.81 
2011 
38 
15 
1 
5 
16 
26 
17 
64.41 
25.42 
1.70 
8.47 
27.12 
44.07 
28.81 
2012 
35 
17 
6 
1 
15 
28 
16 
59.32 
28.81 
10.17 
1.70 
25.42 
47.46 
27.12 
2013 
37 
17 
4 
1 
12 
29 
18 
62.70 
28.80 
6.80 
1.70 
20.34 
49.15 
30.51 
Average 
37 
16 
4 
2 
14 
28 
17 
1 
62.37 
27.79 
5.77 
4.07 
24.07 
48.14 
27.80 
*N = 59(100%) 
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Normality Test 
Normality of data assessment is a prerequisite for many statistical tests 
because normal data are a fundamental assumption in parametric testing. 
In accordance with Kim (2013), Table 4 shows that the values of skewness 
and kurtosis of all variables are less than 2 and 7, respectively. Therefore, 
all variables are considered normal. 
Table 4: Normality Test 
Variables 
Skewness 
Std. Error 
Kurtosis 
Std. Error 
Direct 
1.535 
0.142 
1.460 
0.283 
Indirect 
1.168 
0.142 
0.195 
0.283 
EPS 
0.523 
0.142 
0.054 
0.283 
ROA 
-1.089 
0.142 
1.880 
0.283 
ROE 
-1.964 
0.142 
5.912 
0.283 
CR 
0.565 
0.142 
0.523 
0.283 
TA 
0.493 
0.142 
0.677 
0.283 
*N=295 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 5 shows the Pearson correlation analysis of the independent 
variables. The correlations among independent variables are less than 0.7. 
According to Larose (2006), the results obtained from Table 5 indicate that 
the correlation between the two independent variables, Direct and Indirect, 
is between -0.33 and 0.33. Therefore, these variables are not correlated to 
each other and have no multicollinearity problem. 
Table 5 also shows the correlations of the independent variables (Direct 
and Indirect) with the dependent variables (EPS, ROA, ROE and CR) and 
the control variable (TA). Indirect and Direct are not correlated with the 
dependent (EPS, ROA, ROE, and CR) and control (TA) variables. However, 
the estimation of correlations among independent, dependent and control 
variables is not crucial for the proceeding analyses. 
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Table 5: Correlation Analysis 
Variables 
Indirect 
Direct 
EPS 
ROA 
ROE 
CR 
TA 
Indirect 
1 
-0.264 
0 
0.167 
0.004 
0.097 
0.095 
0.111 
0.056 
0.006 
0.916 
0.143 
0.014 
Direct 
1 
-0.192 
0.001 
-0.189 
0.001 
-0.187 
0.001 
-0.146 
0.012 
-0.171 
0.003 
EPS 
1 
0.645 
0 
0.617 
0 
0.133 
0.022 
0.483 
0 
ROA 
1 
0.934 
0 
0.186 
0.001 
0.294 
0 
ROE 
1 
0.166 
0.004 
0.271 
0 
CR 
1 
-0.224 
0 
TA 
1 
Multicollinearity (Tolerance and VIF) 
Table 6 shows the values of tolerance and VIF of the relationship 
between Direct and Indirect for each dependent variable. The results indicate 
that no multicollinearity relation exists between the two. This finding is 
evident because they are in accordance with the rule of thumb, whereby 
tolerance and VIF values are not between [0.1 and 0.2] and [5 and 10], 
respectively. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis is important to describe the relationship between 
CEO shareholdings and company performance by controlling the company 
size (TA) of the sample companies. According to Table 6, model 1 has the 
highest R2 of 0.251, whereas model 4 has the lowest R2 of 0.085. Although 
model 1 has the highest R2, it accounts for only 25.10% of the variations 
in the dependent variable (EPS). The same condition applies to model 4, 
given that Table 6 reveals that reliance on this model will account for only 
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8.50% in CR. Furthermore, models 2 and 4 show an R2 of about 10%, which 
means the dependent variables, ROA and ROE, are weakly explained by the 
two, respectively. Briefly, each R2 of the models only describes the overall 
results of the relationship among variables but does not provide the specific 
results of a particular variable towards the dependent variable. 
Unstandardized coefficients (P) were used to estimate how the 
independent variables affect the dependent variables by developing a 
regression equation. The values and equations in Table 6 were used to build 
the regression equations as follows: 
Model: CP = a + p1 CS + (32 CSIZE + e 
(i) Y (EPS) = -67.211 -0.103 (DIRECT) + 0.049 (INDIRECT) + 3.957 (TA) 
(ii) Y (ROA) =-24.648 -0.096 (DIRECT) + 0.009 (INDIRECT) + 1.472 (TA) 
(iij) Y (ROE) = -40.680 -0.167 (DIRECT) + 0.030 (INDIRECT) + 2.379 (TA) 
| (iv) Y(CR) = 3.434-0.012 (DIRECT)+ 0.000 (INDIRECT)-0.129 (TA) | 
To test the regression model, we hypothesised that no relationship 
exists between direct CEO shareholding and company performance by 
controlling company size, TA, and no relationship exists between indirect 
CEO shareholding and company performance by controlling company 
size, TA. Table 6 shows the results of regression model A with sub-models 
I, II, III and IV. The results show that Direct is statistically significant 
(p<0.05) to ROA, ROE and CR but shows a statistically weak significance 
(p< 0.1) to EPS. Company size, TA, also shows significance (p<0.05) to 
models I to IV. Moreover, Direct has a negative t-value of-1.767, -2.361, 
-2.301 and -3.271 for EPS, ROA, ROE and CR, respectively. Therefore, a 
significantly negative relationship exists between direct CEO shareholding 
and company performance (EPS, ROA, ROE and CR) by controlling 
company size, TA. Hence, an increase in Direct decreases EPS, ROA, ROE 
and CR. The unstandardized coefficients, (3, reveal that an increase of 1% 
in Direct decreased 16.70% of EPS, 1.20% of ROA, 10.30% of ROE and 
9.60% of CR. 
However, Indirect is statistically insignificant (p>0.05) to company 
performance (EPS, ROA, ROE and CR). Therefore, no relationship 
exists between indirect CEO shareholding and company performance by 
controlling company size, TA. The null hypothesis (H02) is thus accepted. 
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Table 6: Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Model: 
A. CP = a + p1 CS + p2 CSIZE +1 
EPS 
R2= 0.251 
I. EPS = a + p1 DIRECT + 
p2 INDIRECT + p3TA+£ 
ROA 
R2=0.107 
II. ROA=a + p i DIRECT + 
p2 INDIRECT+p3TA+£ 
(Constant) 
Direct 
Indirect 
TA 
(Constant) 
Direct 
Indirect 
TA 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
P 
-67.211 
-0.103 
0.049 
3.957 
-24.648 
-0.096 
0.009 
1.472 
Std. 
Error 
8.773 
0.059 
0.033 
0.449 
6.068 
0.04 
0.023 
0.311 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Beta 
-0.094 
0.078 
0.456 
-0.137 
0.023 
0.268 
t-value 
-7.661 
-1.767 
1.466 
8.806 
-4.062 
-2.361 
0.401 
4.735 
Sig. 
0 
0.078** 
0.144 
0 
0 
0.019* 
0.689 
0 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
0.912 
0.921 
0.960 
0.912 
0.921 
0.960 
VIF 
1.096 
1.086 
1.041 
1.096 
1.086 
1.041 
ROE 
R2=0.096 
III. ROE = a + p1 DIRECT + 
(32 INDIRECT + p3TA+£ 
CR 
R2=0.085 
IV. CR = a + pi DIRECT + 
p2 INDIRECT+ p3TA+£ 
(Constant) 
Direct 
Indirect 
TA 
(Constant) 
Direct 
Indirect 
TA 
*Significant at p <0.05, **Weakly significant 
atp<0.1 
-40.68 
-0.167 
0.03 
2.379 
3.434 
-0.012 
0 
-0.129 
10.893 
0.073 
0.042 
0.558 
0.561 
0.004 
0.002 
0.029 
-0.134 
0.041 
0.243 
-0.192 
-0.008 
-0.256 
-3.734 
-2.301 
0.713 
4.263 
6.117 
-3.271 
-0.137 
-4.476 
0 
0.022* 
0.476 
0 
0 
0.001* 
0.891 
0 
0.912 
0.921 
0.960 
0.912 
0.921 
0.960 
1.096 
1.086 
1.041 
1.096 
1.086 
1.041 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Two main conclusions were derived from this study. First, a significantly 
negative relationship exists between direct CEO shareholding and company 
performance (EPS, ROA, ROE and CR) by controlling company size (TA). 
The percentage of negative relationship between these two variables is 
weak (not more than 17% of the negative relationship overall). This result 
shows that direct CEO shareholding does not improve the performance 
of Malaysian publicly listed companies because of the different practices 
in Malaysia as opposed to the flexibility in western countries, such as the 
United States. In Malaysia, most CEOs tend to keep the controlling right by 
possessing high shareholding in companies. Furthermore, among Malaysian 
publicly listed companies, several began as small-medium enterprises in 
which the founders (CEO) held the highest shareholding. Even after their 
companies are listed in the open market after IPO, these CEOSs tend to 
hold high shareholding to maintain the controlling right of their companies. 
With the controlling right, they acquire the ability and power to decide and 
affect the direction of the company. 
Another reason could be that many Malaysian publicly listed 
companies are family-owned. Hence, family members own enough of the 
equity such that they execute control over strategy and company direction 
and hold top management positions. For instance, in a family-owned 
company, the person who is the controlling shareholder could become the 
CEO of the company. The CEO would want to hold high shareholding to 
retain his or her controlling right in the company. Family members will also 
desire to provide healthy return and protect their wealth with the controlling 
right. Moreover, with high shareholding on hand, family members can avoid 
taking-over of the family-owned business by others. With these strategies, 
their business could last longer and continue to operate in the future. 
Conversely, CEOs in western countries tend to give up their 
shareholding to the public but keep the controlling right and manage to make 
the company perform very well. As mentioned in the introduction, the CEOs 
of Alibaba, Google and Facebook have had their company IPOs listed in the 
American Stock Exchange, namely, NYSE for Alibaba and NASDAQ for 
Google and Facebook. Despite the CEOs of these companies owning less 
shares, these companies continue to perform very well after issuing shares. 
Therefore, Malaysia could learn, change and follow the practice of western 
countries. The Securities Commission of Malaysia (SCM) can consider 
modifying the structure to provide substantial freedom to the companies 
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to decide the structure of their companies at the time of offering, including 
allowing a CEO with minimal shareholding to retain the controlling right. 
According to the literature review, this result is consistent with that 
of Zald (1969) as cited in Catherine and Jonathan (1997). According to 
Zald, a CEO with significant shareholding has the ability to affect company 
direction and is more likely to become more powerful than a CEO with 
minimal shareholding. The result also is consistent with the findings of the 
Greenbury Report (1995) as cited in Ozkan (2011), and Veprauskaite and 
Adams (2013). However, this result is inconsistent with those of several 
previous studies, such as Zald (1969) as cited in Catherine and Jonathan 
(1997), Fischer and Pollock (2004) as cited in Bach and Smith (2007). These 
studies reported that an interactive (positive) relationship exists between 
CEO shareholdings and company performance. 
The second major conclusion of this study is that indirect CEO 
shareholding has an insignificant relationship with company performance 
(EPS, ROA, ROE and CR) by controlling the company size (TA). Indirect 
CEO shareholding refers to the shareholding of the CEO in other related 
companies held by a third party. Therefore, it has no direct impact on 
company performance. Meanwhile, indirect CEO shareholding may be non-
voting right shares. One reason is that companies issue non-voting shares 
to their employees, such as the CEO, so that part of the remuneration can 
be paid in dividend. Another reason is that CEOs receive salaries as their 
remuneration instead of holding any share, which is included as indirect 
share in companies. The main roles of the CEO are to ensure that the overall 
operation and resources are executed and managed well, make major 
corporate decisions and act as the middleman for communication between 
the board of directors and company management to maximise company 
performance. Therefore, indirect CEO shareholding has no relationship 
with company performance (EPS, ROA, ROE and CR). 
In summary, the lower the direct CEO shareholding is, the better the 
company performance is. Although the hypothesis is valid and consistent 
with the context in western countries, the percentage of negative relationship 
between these two variables is very weak. Therefore, the results do not 
completely imply the context in Malaysia. Except for this condition, an 
insignificant relationship exists between indirect CEO shareholding and 
company performance (EPS, ROA, ROE and CR) by controlling company 
size (TA). 
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